FM1-111 Chapter 3

a. Aviation provides the essence of a versatile force whose primary focus is combat operations. General principles that apply and go beyond or derive from the principles of war and the tenets of Army operations (chapter 1) drive mission and execution. FM 1-100 describes aviation operation principles in detail.

b. Army aviation operation principles are as follows:

(1) Aviation operates in the ground regime.

(2) Aviation expands the battlefield in space and time at each echelon.

(3) Aviation performs combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) battlefield functions.

(4) The role of combat aviation is to locate, report and/or destroy enemy ground forces and support elements.

(5) Aviation is concentrated at division and corps level.

(6) Aviation units are integrated into the combined arms down to the level at which they will be employed.

(7) Planning times for aviation and ground maneuver elements will be the same.

a. The general principles listed above drive Army aviation mission planning for - and execution of - combat operations. By providing guidance beyond the principles of war and the tenets of Army operations, they establish the broad doctrinal focus of Army aviation operations.

b. For example, when applying these principles, aviation commanders -

(1) Define aviation's role as an essential member of the combined arms team.

(2) Integrate Army aviation into all strategic, operational, and tactical operations to achieve success.

(3) Enable Army aviation to retain tactical maneuver advantage over the enemy.

(4) Shape the battlespace with aerial and ground maneuver forces during combined arms, joint, combined, special, and contingency operations.

a. The focus of Army aviation must enhance ground-paced maneuver and exploit maneuver. Army aviation has the capability to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power in the third dimension. Thus, aviation accelerates the tempo of combat operations while remaining an integral part of the combined arms team. During offensive and defensive operations, the aviation brigade is employed offensively to retain the initiative and offensive spirit critical to successful operations in close, deep, and rear areas.

b. In planning aviation operations, the brigade commander and his staff must consider several factors. The two primary factors are the higher commander's intent and mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). After the analysis is completed, a concept of operation is developed. Then orders are issued for execution by subordinate elements. Other considerations include risk analysis and CSS.

a. Mission. The specified task or mission issued to the aviation brigade must be fully understood. The brigade commander—and his staff—must determine whether the commander’s units can fulfill the mission as prescribed. If not, the commander must convey to higher headquarters what augmentation or support he needs to accomplish the mission.

b. Enemy. Commanders must know enemy doctrine, tactics, forces, and objectives; assess enemy capabilities and intentions; exploit enemy weaknesses; and focus intelligence assets. All information available about the enemy should be obtained through a detailed brigade S2 intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This information must be continuously updated and thoroughly disseminated. The IPB is one of the most important aspects of planning. FM 34-130 discusses IPB in detail.

c. Terrain. The terrain is as important as the mission and enemy. Many details about the terrain can be obtained through IPB. However, several other factors should also be considered. These include environmental conditions of the aviation brigade's area of operations (AO), the weather, and surface conditions that may affect both friendly and enemy operations.

d. Troops. Troops available include those units assigned to the aviation brigade as well as other forces that may be task-organized with the brigade. Aviation brigades can also accept operational control (OPCON) of other aviation forces. Section III covers task organization in more detail.

e. Time Available. Time is also a critical consideration. Time may include time of execution as well as time for preparation of a particular operation or mission. Ideally, planning at higher headquarters consumes one-third of the time allocated; subordinate units should be allowed two-thirds of the time for their planning and preparation.

a. Aviation Brigade Pure. Aviation brigades may be employed as an aviation brigade pure force. As a pure force, aviation brigades offer the force commander the agility and flexibility to create windows of opportunity and to strike aggressively and decisively against threat operational and tactical centers of gravity. Speed, range, and mobility are inherent in an aviation-pure organization.

b. Combined Arms. Aviation brigades may be task-organized with other maneuver forces or be the controlling headquarters for a combined arms force. The combined arms organization provides force commanders the unique capability to accelerate the tempo of ground maneuver operations while employing ground and air maneuver to keep the enemy off balance. Appendix F covers combined arms operations in detail.

c. Force Protection. Pure aviation brigades are minimally manned to provide force protection. When attached, external force protection support personnel must be ready to provide ground security around and throughout the brigade assembly areas (AAs). Force protection packages vary according to the mission, operating environment, and sizes and locations of the AA(s).

a. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. Synchronization relies on the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms and services. It requires a unity of purpose that fuses close, deep, and rear operations. Synchronization also depends on the mastery of time-space relationships as well as knowledge of enemy and friendly capabilities. Careful and complete planning and coordination are extremely important for integrating the combat power of aviation forces with other combined arms assets. The goal of synchronization is to use every asset where, when, and in the manner in which it contributes most to superiority at the point of decision.

b. Forces in combined arms operations complement each other's objectives. Aviation and ground forces do not always attack along the same axis or have identical objectives. The key is to plan operations that synchronize combat power to constantly pressure the enemy.

c. Aviation brigades are integrated into the scheme of maneuver through liaison operations ( LOs). Also, aviation unit commanders coordinate face-to-face with ground commanders as described in paragraph 2-17 (Liaison Operations).

a. Command Relationships. Command relationships are assigned, attached, under OPCON, or under tactical control (TACON). Aviation forces operating in the maneuver role may be placed under OPCON or TACON of another maneuver headquarters (normally brigade and higher) for a specific mission or period of time. Aviation forces also may conduct CS and CSS operations under OPCON; however, they usually operate in a support relationship.

b. Support Relationships. Joint Publication (JP 0-2) states that—when a superior commander decides that one force should aid, assist, protect, or sustain another force—a support relationship will be established between the forces. Direct support (DS), general support (GS), and mutual support (defined below) are the only support relationships that apply to Army aviation operations. For example, assault helicopter and medium helicopter units may perform air movement operations or command aviation assets may enhance command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) operations.

(1) Mutual Support: Mutual support is the support that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02)

(2) General Support: General support is the support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)

(3) Direct Support: Direct support is the support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. (JP 1-02)

a. The employment of aviation units differs little from that of typical ground maneuver forces. The principles below are guidelines for the employment of aviation assets operating on the modern battlefield. These principles are further described as they pertain to aviation brigades.

(1) Fight as an integral part of the combined arms team. Integration of aviation employment is key to the overall scheme of maneuver. Aviation brigade assets are optimized when integrated into the ground tactical plan. Aviation brigades can conduct independent or pure aviation brigade operations; however, they are normally a member of the combined arms team. Aviation brigades require augmentation to conduct independent operations for extended periods. Whether pure or task-organized, they increase the tempo of operations. When employed as a member of the combined arms team, aviation brigades also help ensure that the enemy has to fight in more than one direction.

(2) Exploit the capabilities of other branches and services. During all operations, aviation brigade assets rely on other branches or services or both. The aviation brigade at any echelon must be employed with other branches to offset its own vulnerabilities; thus, it must exploit the strengths of other branches and services. For example, during a maneuver operation, ground units expose the enemy. Then aviation forces—including combat, CS and CSS—exploit the enemy's weaknesses. These assets must be fully exercised to obtain their maximum potential.

(3) Capitalize on intelligence-gathering capabilities. Aviation brigades provide the force commander with enormous intelligence-gathering capabilities. Thus, the commander must focus on his intelligence-gathering assets and integrate or capitalize on the capabilities of all assets available for mutual support.

(4) Suppress enemy weapons and acquisition means. Enemy air defense (AD) weapons and acquisition systems may be defeated actively or passively. The aviation brigade commander must accomplish one or both of these tasks. Passive means include terrain flight techniques, employment of aviation survivability equipment (ASE), and avoidance. Active measures include direct or indirect weapons employment against a particular target. Aviation brigade elements may perform this mission in a mutually supporting role or depend on other branches or services for this function. During the planning and execution of an operation, aviation brigades must use assets such as attack aircraft, field artillery (FA), intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support forces, US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN), and US Marine Corps (USMC) assets or a combination of these.

(5) Exploit firepower. Aviation brigades allow the force commander to exploit firepower in several ways. Attack helicopter units provide direct fires during offensive and defensive operations. Aviation units—particularly target acquisition companies and platoons—observe and adjust indirect fires. Assault and medium helicopter units position and resupply AD, antitank, and FA units across the battlefield. The aviation brigade lends depth to the force, as in defensive operations when they may be employed to cover the deployment of ground maneuver forces. They also are well suited to attack trailing enemy formations.

(6) Exploit mobility. Aviation brigades allow the force commander to position fire and maneuver assets rapidly anywhere on the battlefield. These forces quickly position themselves at critical points to counterattack enemy penetrations, exploit and pursue enemy retrograde actions, or influence enemy actions deep in enemy rear areas. Also, aviation brigades conduct air assault and air movement as a part of the overall scheme of maneuver to provide mobility for the force commander.

(7) Exploit surprise. With their increased firepower and mobility, aviation brigades can exploit surprise when and where the enemy least expects it. Aviation forces may be employed day or night—and in some adverse weather conditions—to enhance the element of surprise. Planning, however, remains critical to the success of the unit.

(8) Mass forces. Mobility plays a vital role in massing forces. Aviation brigade assets can be rapidly positioned and repositioned at critical points on the battlefield. Combat power is refocused relentlessly anywhere on the battlefield to exploit the enemy's weaknesses.

(9) Use terrain for survivability. Although aviation brigade maneuver, CS, and CSS units are not restricted by terrain, they are—in a sense—bound by terrain for survivability. Aviation forces also must use terrain for cover and concealment as their ground counterparts. Army airspace command and control (A²C²) is a necessary element; it ensures that a force commander's "airspace" is not violated and that personnel and equipment are not lost needlessly.

(10) Displace forward elements frequently. Aviation brigades typically are not displaced well forward as an entire unit. Elements of the brigade may be employed for a specific mission or period of time based on METT-T.

(11) Maintain flexibility. Aviation brigades greatly enhance a force commander's flexibility. While the focus may be on close or deep operations, aviation brigade assets may be tasked to perform rear operations at the same time or as a separate action. Flexibility provided by aviation brigades allows the commander to combine the firepower and mobility employed with surprise and the massing of troops to conduct combined arms and joint operations.

(12) Exercise staying power. If planned in detail and coordinated properly, aviation brigade assets may be employed for a sustained period of time or for a specific operation. Aviation forces greatly enhance the commander's staying power. However, they must be augmented by CS and CSS to increase their staying power. Through integration of CS and CSS assets with aviation and other maneuver forces; these assets are available for future operations, as well as for present operations.

b. The guidelines for Army aviation employment are a collection of flexible, common sense ideas. They are not to be rigidly applied; these ideas, instead, must be carefully tailored to each situation. Certain situations may require emphasis on one or more of the principles. Leaders must weigh the operational payoff against the inherent risk.

a. Aviation brigades provide the force commander with the capability to conduct missions across the range of military operations. This section focuses on those missions the aviation brigade is required to execute. It describes the major employment roles and other battlefield functions related to the employment principles of aviation brigades. These roles and principles complement the participation of aviation brigades in combined arms, joint, combined, and special operations. The employment roles for aviation brigade operations include combat, CS, and CSS. Normally, in the CS and CSS roles, aviation brigades are force providers.

b. Knowledge of the threat, IPB, and METT-T are the keys to balancing aviation's employment principles properly. Thus, the commander can achieve success on the modern battlefield.

a. Attack. Attack helicopter operations normally are offensive in nature; however, they may be conducted during offensive or defensive operations. Attack helicopter battalions (ATKHBs) operate in the close, deep, and rear environments. Attack helicopter capabilities include antiarmor, antipersonnel, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), joint air attack team (JAAT), limited air combat, and the destruction of enemy facilities and materiel. Attack helicopter missions include raids, exploitations, pursuits, deceptions, counterattacks, spoiling attacks, reconnaissance, and security. Attack helicopter operations can cause the enemy to divert combat forces and force the untimely commitment of follow-on forces. The intent behind all attack operations is to hinder the threat's current and future operations. Essential elements for attack operations include friendly and enemy situational awareness, an extensive SEAD effort; command, control, communications, and countermeasures (C³CM); and well-planned and supportable CSS.

b. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance operations obtain information by visual observation or electronic detection methods. This information may concern the activities and resources of an actual/potential enemy, or the meteorologic, hydrographic, and/or geographic characteristics of a particular area. The division cavalry and air reconnaissance squadrons conduct this mission as part of the aviation brigade or are employed directly by the division commander. The cavalry and air reconnaissance squadrons conduct zone, area, and route reconnaissance as well as force-oriented and reconnaissance-in-force operations. Although not their primary mission, ATKHBs also can perform reconnaissance. FM 1-112 and FM 17-95 provide detailed procedures for reconnaissance operations.

c. Security. Security forces provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for the main body. Security operations include screen, guard, cover, and rear area security missions. Although not a formal type of security operation, air assault security also is a critical mission performed by attack helicopters.

(1) Screening force operations. Screening operations are conducted within supporting indirect fires from the main body. The cavalry squadron normally conducts screening operations for the division commander or in support of a ground brigade. FM 17-95 discusses screen operations in detail. An overview of screen missions includes:

(a) Maintaining surveillance.

(b) Providing early warning to the main body.

(c) Impeding and harassing the enemy with supporting fires.

(d) Performing counterreconnaissance by destroying enemy reconnaissance elements.

(2) Guard force operations. Guard operations are conducted within supporting indirect fires from the main body, and accomplish all the tasks of a screening force. In addition, a guard force prevents enemy ground observation of, and direct fire against, the main body. A guard force may reconnoiter, conduct target acquisition and engagement, attack, defend, and delay to accomplish its mission. FM 17-95 discusses guard operations in detail.

(3) Covering force operations.

(a) A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. However, a covering force may operate outside the range of the main body's indirect fires and is a tactically self-contained force.

(b) Armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) normally conduct covering force operations for the corps. If the corps has an ACR, the corps aviation brigade may be required to augment it. If the corps has no ACR, the aviation brigade may be tasked as the covering force headquarters. In this situation, the aviation brigade commander can expect to be augmented with additional ground maneuver forces, CS, and CSS. He also should be relieved of deep and rear operational requirements when conducting operations as a covering force.

(c) A division covering force probably will be a brigade-size task force (TF). If the division aviation brigade is tasked to be the covering force headquarters, the brigade commander can expect to be augmented with ground maneuver forces and additional CS and CSS. If the aviation brigade is not tasked to be the covering force headquarters, the aviation brigade commander can expect to support the covering force operation with aviation brigade assets. FM 17-95 discusses covering force operations in detail.

d. Air Assault. Aircraft are vulnerable during movement, insertion, and extraction operations; therefore, they require support from combined arms resources. Attack helicopter units and FA normally are integrated into the movement, insertion, extraction, and ground tactical plans to provide security and to weight combat power. Terrain flight techniques mask unit movements, thus enhancing survivability and deception. While air assault operations are tied directly to the ground tactical plan, coordination time normally is short. These operations are enhanced when pathfinders or personnel trained in air assault coordinate landing zone (LZ) and pickup zone (PZ) activities. Comprehensive standing operating procedures (SOPs) and habitual training relationships also make these operations more effective. Assault helicopter battalions (AHBs) deliver forces directly into close, deep, and rear combat operations. Air assault forces—

(1) Seize and retain key terrain.

(2) Engage and destroy rear area threats.

(3) Attack and/or counterattack during close and deep operations.

(4) Conduct raids and deception operations.

(5) Block or contain enemy forces.

e. Special Operations (SO). Aviation brigades may be employed in roles critical to the success of SO. They also may operate with, augment, or participate in SO. Aviation brigades may have to provide aviation support to special operation forces (SOF)—conducting unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, antiterrorism, and other SO activities. FM 1-108 and Appendix K of this manual describe SO missions and operations.

f. Theater Missile Defense(TMD).

(1) TMD is a joint mission with four primary pillars:active defense; passive defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I). The aviation brigade’s primary contribution comes in the area of attack operations. The aviation brigade can execute this mission using either of two methods, depending on theconditions with which it is confronted. If the enemy's precise location is known, the mission can be planned and executed like a standard deliberate attack. The more likely method is search and attack. This method is used when the targets are moving or only an approximate location is known. The aviation brigade uses its available intelligence and the speed of movement of the TMD to establish a search area. When available, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can precede the unit into the area to aid in the search. Ingress and egress to and from the search area are executed like any other deep mission; however, the technique used for the search of the area itself is based on METT-T. The airspace requirements for this mission are extensive until complete situational awareness is available to all joint players. The risks also are very high compared to the assets executing the mission; however, only the aviation brigade can find and kill these targets without a precise location provided by another sensor. A possible extension of both methods—mentioned in FM 100-12—is a divert mission at the discretion of the appropriate commander. This means that an attack unit would have some or all of it's assets diverted to attack a TMD target during the conduct of another mission. This mission is high risk one even when attempted with the presence of the following imperatives:

(a) Notification and planning. Notification comes in the form of a "be prepared" or "on order" mission to the commander from his higher headquarters to execute TMD operations. This notice allows the unit to develop routes, supporting SEAD packages, and control measures to execute the mission.

(b) Communications. A clear over-the-horizon communications link between the aviation brigade/battalion and the air mission commander of the attack helicopter force conducting the deep attack is required. Through this communications link, the mission change order is given and all pertinent supporting information passes. Digital connectivity between the aviation unit to both the intelligence and FS structures also is required. These links give the executing unit the truth about the enemy’s ground situation at the new objective area as well as during the ingress and egress phases. They also help protect the executing aviation unit from fratricide without taking those critical long-range shooters out of the fight.

(c) Training. For TMD training to take place, the unit must haveTMD included in the unit mission essential task list (METL), which allocates time and resources for training in TMD.

(2) FM 100-1 contains a more detailed discussion of general TMD operations. Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for TMD attack helicopter operations can be found in FM 1-112. JP 3-01.5 describes joint TMD.

g. Support by Fire. In the support by fire role, the aviation brigade directs attack helicopters into an overwatch position to establish a base of fire. This action allows other maneuver assets to move to, or around, the target area or engaged enemy force. The intent of this action can range from suppression to destruction of the enemy force, but the primary mission is to fix the enemy force so another friendly force can maneuver.

a. C³I Enhancement. Maintaining C³ is critical to any operation. The continuous flow of intelligence also is vital. Operating at long ranges and against enemy EW hinders C³I.

(1) Aviation brigades can quickly provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of friendly lines of communication. These lines also include future locations. Brigade assets also may have to maintain surveillance of the area or provide security while an area is being established. Brigade assets may deliver messages and documents that cannot be electronically transmitted in a nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) or a jamming environment. Brigade elements have this mission most often when radio listening silence is imposed or equipment has become inoperable. Messages may include combat plans and orders, written coordination and control measures, and graphics. Documents delivered are critical reports essential for sustaining combat operations. These lines include—

Roads.
Air and ground supply routes.
Relay and retransmission sites.
Critical signal nodes.
Microwave facilities.
Telephone wire structures and systems.
Air and sea points of debarkation.
Supply and maintenance centers

(2) Brigade elements may provide communications enhancement through airborne retransmission or transport retransmission/relay equipment. They also may expedite movement of one or more command posts (CPs). Brigade assets permit commanders to see their AO easily. Thus, commanders can better control their units. Other brigade tasks may include liaison between units required to transmit intelligence and to verify the unit situation and location. Other intelligence functions include target acquisition, reconnaissance, and employment of intelligence-gathering systems. All heliborne platforms can contribute to these type operations.

b. Air Movement. In air movement operations, aviation brigade assets sustain air and ground maneuver units during close, deep, and rear operations. Air movement operations deliver troops, supplies, and equipment while remaining clear of enemy engagements. Assault and medium helicopter units are employed with their aircraft in both internal and external load configurations. Aviation brigade units emplace and reposition critical combat units, equipment, and supplies for current and/or future maneuver operations.

c. Aerial Mine Warfare. Aviation brigades conduct aerial mine warfare as a large-scale operation. This operation is part of the overall engineer plan. The entire brigade may be employed with attack or reconnaissance units to secure the operation. At the same time, utility helicopter assets rapidly deliver mines, aerially, to a designated area as prescribed in the plan. The Volcano system gives the aviation brigade the capability to emplace large minefields rapidly. This operation may be conducted in the countermobility role to inhibit the enemy's movement either in an offensive operation or a retrograde operation to prevent the enemy from withdrawing. This operation promotes friendly offensive operations, particularly while friendly elements are in pursuit. Aerial mine warfare also may assist in friendly mobility operations. Emplacing mines into blocking positions inhibits the threat from hindering friendly movement. FM 1-113 contains detailed information on employment of Volcano minefields.

d. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Aviation units normally conduct CSAR operations to recover friendly isolated personnel. These operations may include locating and extracting friendly ground elements that have been cut off or left behind. This mission is not to be confused with medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Appendix D discusses in CSAR operations in detail.

e.Air Traffic Services. ATS units support A²C² systems as a subordinate element of A²C². ATS liaison personnel—along with other staff representatives—are located within the division, corps, and theater A²C² elements. They provide functional area (technical) expertise in the operation of the A²C² system. ATS integration elements at the division and corps airspace information centers (AICs) use organic communications and navigational systems to update air operations information. The information pertains to friendly, unknown, and hostile aircraft and the overall A²C² situation. ATS elements may provide the main communications link to support Army aviation and ground maneuver unit requirements; for example, to establish and control forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), PZs and LZs—and temporary airdrop or air-land areas—and for joint or multinational forces. ATS units provide a range of tactical support during deep, close, and rear operations. This support may include various services required by Army, service component, and allied aircraft. Some of these services are—

Airspace deconfliction during current operations.
Navigational assistance.
Flight following.
Air threat warnings.
Weather information.
Artillery advisories.
En route navigational structures.
Landing area terminal control.

f. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. In the IEW role, aviation brigade cavalry and reconnaissance units gather intelligence and perform counterintelligence and counter-counterintelligence. They perform these missions by seeing the enemy and destroying his assets that can see our forces. These assets monitor and report enemy activity. The division aviation brigade's organic EH-60 Black Hawk aircraft also provide some IEW capabilities through communications interception, jamming, and direction finding.

a. Sustainment. Sustainment is the movement of equipment, materiel, supplies, and personnel by utility/cargo and fixed-wing assets for operations other than air assault and combat support. Missions include intratheater airlift; administrative relocation of troops and nonmilitary personnel; and administrative relocation of equipment, materiel ,and supplies. Aviation maintenance and logistics operations are critical to sustaining all aviation forces. Inherent are the functions required for the CSS of aviation brigade units as well as other maneuver, CS, and CSS forces.

b. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Aviation units—such as assault or medium helicopter forces—may have to augment the aeromedical capability during mass casualty situations or when the tactical situation dictates. During these situations, commanders must weigh the risk of transporting casualties by nonmedical resources that cannot provide en route medical care. Often a casualty may have a better chance of survival if left in the care of ground medical personnel until medical transportation assets arrive. Aeromedical evacuation units assigned to the MEDEVAC battalion have the primary mission for medical evacuation. They are employed well forward in the combat zone (CZ) in direct support of a division AO. Personnel may be evacuated from as far forward as the tactical situation permits, normally the maneuver supplies. Aviation maintenance /logistics operations are critical to sustaining all aviation forces.

a. FM 100-5 states that battlespace is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. At the brigade level, it is determined by the range of direct fire systems and the terrain on which these systems are applied. Battlespace includes the breadth, depth, and height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battlespace is not assigned by a higher commander and extends beyond the commander's current AO. Battlespace includes the combat power of all friendly forces that can be brought to bear against the enemy, including joint and combined forces.

b. An aviation brigade commander's battlespace is dictated by the organization's ability to acquire and engage the enemy with direct fire systems. It is not limited by division or even corps boundaries or graphics. Therefore—because attack aviation assets provide the force the greatest extension of direct fire capability—both the corps and division aviation brigade commander's battlespace is at least equal to the corps commander's battlespace. As a result of the aviation brigades ability—at both corps and division levels—to acquire and engage the enemy throughout a given AO, both corps and division aviation brigade commanders must be prepared to fight the corps deep battle as well as the division's close battle. For example, combat operations may require all attack battalions within the corps to conduct deep strikes against threat ground forces hours or even days before those threat forces enter into close combat operations with friendly ground forces. As the ground battle compresses in both time and space, all attack battalions within the corps may be required to focus on the division's close fight.

c. Within a given battlespace, aviation brigade commanders must understand the effects of geography and terrain; they must appropriately apply the use of organic capabilities and be prepared to integrate available joint and multinational assets in actual or potential operations.

d. The aviation brigade commander's potential battlespace extends out to the range of the attack helicopter assets; therefore, the aviation brigade staff should identify and plot all potential engagement areas (EAs) within that range. In addition, ATKHB primary and alternate BPs should be designated around the EAs, with proposed air corridors extending from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to the various BPs. This identification and plotting process allows for a smoother and more expeditious transition into contingency operations. This is true especially if the ATKHB(s) are currently employed when the contingency operation develops.

e. Unity of effort is essential to operations within a given battlespace. Ownership of assets is less important than application of their effects toward an intended purpose. In that way, battlespace can overlap, shared by other commanders who perceive ways to employ their respective assets to mutual advantage.

a. The aviation brigade maneuvers rapidly and simultaneously in the ground commander’s battlespace to bring decisive combat power to bear at the decisive points and times in the AO. There is an inextricable linkage between maneuver and fires. The aviation brigade maneuvers while leveraging organic firepower to shape the battlespace or conduct decisive operations as directed by the aviation brigade commander.

b. The aviation brigade commander compresses battlespace by shortening and/or mitigating the effects of time/distance factors and terrain on maneuver. His forces also reduce time requirements through speed and mobility once thorough planning is complete. The aviation brigade’s ability to operate in all dimensions of the battlespace provides a degree of flexibility and agility that is unique.

c. Synchronizing aviation maneuver with ground maneuver allows the friendly force commander to shape the battlespace to set the conditions for the close fight and achieve a potential advantage in time and space by altering the enemy’s tempo. Linked with deep fires, the aviation brigade’s maneuver offers the ground commander the capability to influence events simultaneously through the AO.

a. FM 100-5 takes the concept of warfighting beyond fighting battles sequentially. It discusses conducting operations throughout the enemy's depth to gain synergistic effects over an adversary. Simultaneous attack in depth means being able to attack and defeat the enemy anywhere between friendly rear and enemy rear boundaries, and to conduct these operations simultaneously. Simultaneous attacks—throughout the depth of the battlefield—place critical enemy functions at risk at the same time. They deny the enemy the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. They also deny the enemy the cohesion required to execute his plan. They induce friction into his scheme of maneuver and degrade his will to fight.

b. Fighting in depth expands the battlefield in time, space, resources, and purpose. Simultaneous attack is the application of combat power throughout the depth of enemy forces and functions in such a way as to cause destruction, confusion, and demoralization. This method provides the commander the focus necessary to strike decisively and denies the enemy options for conducting military operations. Thus, it allows the commander to completely dominate the tempo of the battlefield.

c. Through the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS), aviation brigades have access to battlefield technology that integrates and synchronizes tactical and joint systems. This technology gives them the ability to detect, track, and strike targets in depth. Combining enhanced acquisition, longer range delivery, and precision strike gives the commander the ability to mass devastating effects simultaneously with an economy of means.

d. Synchronization of deep, close, and rear operations is a complex undertaking. It requires a clear understanding of the commander's intent within the organization, stimulating both command and staff initiative. Effective operations, in depth, require dynamic, anticipatory responses to synchronize a variety of assets. The ultimate success in synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations determines the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns.

a. Close operations involve actions taken against enemy forces in contact with friendly ground forces. Close operations may be conducted simultaneously with deep and/or rear operations. Close operations at any echelon comprise the current activities of major committed ground combat elements together with their immediate CS and CSS. At the tactical level, close operations comprise the efforts of smaller tactical units—such as aviation brigades—to win current engagements. Close operations bear the ultimate burden of success or failure in combat. The success of deep and rear operations is measured by their eventual contribution to close operations. Close, deep, and rear operations are interdependent.

b. Integral activities during close operations include attack, assault, CAS, indirect FS (including counterfire), CS, and CSS of committed forces. During close operations, aviation brigades may be employed as a security or reserve force in the security or main battle area. Aviation forces are integrated and synchronized into the commander's scheme of maneuver.

c. Aviation brigades at all echelons conduct close operations. The planning and execution of close operations are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

a. Deep operations may be conducted simultaneously with close and/or rear operations. Deep operations comprise activities directed against enemy forces not in contact with friendly ground forces. The objective of deep operations is to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces, facilities, and high-payoff systems. These activities are designed to influence the conditions in which current/future close operations are occurring or will occur. At the tactical level, deep operations shape the battlefield to obtain advantages in subsequent engagements. Successful deep operations create the conditions for future victory. The principal targets of deep operations are the freedom of action of the opposing commander and the coherence and tempo of his operations.

b. During deep operations, aviation brigades may conduct attack, assault, surveillance and target acquisition, deception operations, C³CM, and C³. Aviation brigades also may provide security for a larger force.

c. Aviation brigades at all echelons can conduct deep operations. The planning and execution of deep operations are discussed in detail later in this chapter as well as in Appendix G.

a. Close, Deep, and Rear Operations Sustainment. Aviation CS and CSS assets sustain other maneuver, CS, and CSS units in the rear area in support of current and future close, deep, and rear operations. They support the tempo of combat, ensuring the ability to take advantage of all opportunities without delay.

b. Movements Control. Aviation units may assist in movements control by providing C² aircraft to monitor or facilitate movements in the rear area. They also may assist through surveillance and protection of main supply routes (MSRs).

c. Terrain Management. Aviation forces take part in terrain management. They provide C² aircraft for rear C² assets to move rapidly in the rear areas to expedite terrain management operations. They also manage their assigned sectors, AAs, or support areas.

d. Security. Aviation brigades and subordinate units play a key role in rear area security. Attack, cavalry, or air reconnaissance units assist in the rear IPB. They can reconnoiter likely LZs, drop zones ( DZs), and avenues of approach that may be used by the enemy. They may also detect and delay or defeat rear area levels of threat as described in Table 3-1 below. Aviation brigades or subordinate elements are employed mainly as a tactical combat force to counter level III incursions. They may delay or destroy enemy forces en route or after they have arrived in the rear area. As a tactical combat force (TCF), aviation assets are employed best with other maneuver forces to counter rear threats; however, they may be employed independently.

e. Planning and Execution. Aviation brigades at all echelons conduct rear area operations. The planning and execution of rear operations are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Level I
Those enemy forces that base or base cluster defenses are capable of defeating.

Level II
Those enemy forces that base or base cluster defenses are not capable of defeating. Response forces, such as MPs, are required to counter Level II threats.

Level III
Those enemy forces that have entered the rear area and must be countered by tactical combat forces, such as infantry, armor, and aviation.

a. The battlefield framework helps commanders relate their forces to one another—and to the enemy—in time, space, resources, and purpose. The battlefield framework establishes an area of geographical and operational responsibility for the aviation brigade commander. It provides a way to visualize how forces will be employed against the enemy.

b. At echelons above the aviation brigade level, the battlefield framework is agreed upon and coordinated. This framework results in a graphic depiction of the boundaries separating corps, divisions, maneuver brigades within the divisions, battle handover lines (BHLs) , and the separate corps and division deep operations areas of responsibility. From these graphics, the aviation brigade commander is able to determine on which geographical areas the close, deep, and rear operations planning processes will focus. These boundaries are provided to the aviation brigade staff by the next higher echelon. The aviation brigade staff, in turn, provides them to all subordinate battalion staffs.

c. Once the various force boundaries have been established and provided to the aviation brigade, the aviation brigade commander can begin the planning process. However—because of battlefield fluidity echelons above corps (EAC), corps and division aviation brigades can be employed anywhere in the corps sector—the boundaries designating specific operational areas of responsibility may change at any time. Therefore, aviation brigade commanders at all echelons must be ready to shift focus should the situation require.

a. The close, deep and rear operations targeting process is initiated at echelons above the aviation brigade level. This process incorporates the decide,detect, deliver, andassess (D³A) methodology defined below.

(1) Decide. The decision phase determines where the enemy will be attacked, what specific enemy systems will be attacked, the priority of those enemy systems designated to be attacked, when these enemy systems will be attacked, and what friendly attack systems will be employed during the engagements. This phase provides the focus and priorities for collection management and fire planning. This phase is a result of the intelligence estimate, the commander's mission analysis, current and future friendly force operations, and probabilities of enemy courses of action. As a result of this process, the brigade commander receives specific guidance regarding targeting information. Included in this guidance will be a developed targeting list.

(2) Detect. The detection phase begins with the aviation brigade staff tasking, and/or requesting, the support of intelligence gathering assets (sensors) to support the operation. The tasking/request for tasking of intelligence gathering assets should be accomplished immediately after the decision phase is complete. This tasking incorporates the sensors into the operations planning process early on; it increases the probability that the right sensors are focused on the right areas, at the right time. Once the designated targets have been observed and identified, continuous tracking by the sensors must be conducted. Observation, identification, and tracking information must be transmitted from the sensors to the various echeloned staff elements throughout the duration of the operation. Available battle command systems will determine which staffs receive information directly from the sensors and which staffs receive information transmitted down from their next higher. If onboard aircraft systems allow, pertinent information and intelligence also should be transmitted directly to the aircraft; this continues until the operation is complete. The aviation brigade commander must ensure that all pertinent information/intelligence relative to the operation is provided—and updated as necessary —to the aviation brigade staff and executing units. Last, the aviation brigade commander must ensure that the detection process continues until mission completion.

(3) Deliver. The delivery phase is the execution of fires on targets. This phase is initiated by a trigger event or projected target activity. At this point, the aviation brigade launches organic and aviation assets under OPCON of the designated area of responsibility, conducts the operation, and returns to the AA. This phase may require several turnarounds in which aviation assets expend their ordnance or conduct air assaults, return to conduct FARP operations, then continue with the operation before returning to the AA for mission completion.

(4) Assess. Target assessment is the status of targets after the targets have been serviced, and should be conducted as soon as possible. Attack helicopter units should make every attempt to determine the status of their targets immediately after an attack and report their battle damage assessments (BDAs) up through the chain of command. Intelligence personnel should be present at the crew debriefing to extract critical data and follow-up initial BDAs. Gun camera tapes should be provided to higher whenever possible.

a. Command and Control.

(1) The aviation brigade command process normally does not change between close, deep, and rear operations. Division aviation brigade assets may be under OPCON to a corps aviation brigade for the duration of an operation or corps aviation assets may fall under the command of a division aviation brigade commander. It is possible that aviation units will be under OPCON to a rear area commander—ground or aviation—for rear area operations. These possibilities further emphasize the fact that aviation brigade commanders and their units must be able to fight anywhere and anytime on the battlefield. Normally, the location where the operation will be conducted (corps or division operations area of responsibility) will dictate which aviation brigade commander commands the operation.

(2) In an operation where aviation assets are under the OPCON of another aviation brigade, the relinquishing/gaining commanders will ensure that the OPCON unit is integrated—tactically and logistically—into the planning process as soon as possible. A liaison officer (LNO) from the relinquishing unit should be dispatched to the gaining command upon notification of the planned OPCON status. As soon as possible thereafter, the commander of the unit to be placed under OPCON should conduct personal coordination with the gaining aviation brigade commander.

(3) Aviation brigade operations require the concentrated efforts of the entire brigade staff to coordinate and synchronize. These extensive coordination and synchronization requirements involve numerous staff functions beyond the scope of a single aviation brigade staff. Specifically, the aviation brigade staff coordinates and synchronizes with other corps/division level assets, corps/division level staffs, subordinate maneuver units, adjacent units, supporting EAC units, and supporting service assets.

b. Command Communications Systems. Tactical information flow varies, depending on the individual unit's battle command systems capabilities. For over-the-horizon communications, some units may require fixed-wing relay while others are equipped with high frequency nap-of-the-earth (HF NOE) communications, while still other units may use satellite communications (SATCOM). As individual unit—ground and aviation—and joint communications systems are upgraded, information flow directly between sensors and shooters may prove to be more tactically advantageous to the aviation brigade and subordinate battalion commanders (i.e., reduced relay time).

a. Planning is initiated with an operations plan/operations order (OPLAN/OPORD) passed down from a higher echelon to the aviation brigade. Paragraphs 3-27 and 3-28 discuss planning and execution actions generic to close and deep missions. Refer to Appendix G for a detailed checklist of deep operations planning and execution tasks.

(1) For close operations, key OPLAN/OPORD information should include the commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, main effort, priority of fires, and support graphics such as the engineer overlay, fire control measures, and maneuver graphics. The OPLAN/OPORD also dictates if aviation brigade units are to be placed under the OPCON of a ground maneuver brigade (and, if so, which brigade[s]) or operate under the C² of the aviation brigade commander.

(2) Fordeep operations, the OPLAN/OPORD should state the commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, and identify the aviation brigade as having priority of effort. Therefore, a direct support FA unit also should be designated to support the aviation brigade's deep operation.

(3) Despite the type operation, the OPLAN/OPORD identifies which engagement areas/air assault objectives will be the focus of the operation. If the operation is an attack, the OPLAN/OPORD should specify the destruction criteria—i.e., the minimum percentage of threat equipment to be destroyed—to achieve mission success.

b. The OPLAN/OPORD sets in motion these aviation brigade staff close and deep planning actions. (These actions assume that the aviation brigade commander retains C² over the brigade's assets during the operation.)

(1) ACTION: The aviation brigade commander establishes liaison—if not already established—with the ground maneuver brigade commander(s) over whose ground space aviation assets will operate. If possible, initial coordination should be conducted face-to-face between the aviation brigade commander and the ground brigade commander (s).

(2) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff must seek and maintain situational awareness. Intelligence updates are the hinge upon which close, deep, and rear operations are planned and executed. The brigade staff must aggressively seek continuous, accurate intelligence and disseminated it to the subordinate battalions as quickly as possible. Simply waiting for the next higher to transmit intelligence data fails to maintain focus on the brigade commander's intelligence requirements. The enemy's location and capabilities on the battlefield significantly influence friendly mission planning and execution. Battle command systems are established that allow the brigade staff to request/receive intelligence updates directly from the next higher's G2.

(3) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff must ensure that the aviation brigade commander is aware of all available airspace that can be used during any given brigade operation. Airspace that is restricted from use or dedicated to other airspace users is indicated in the airspace control order (ACO). While the ACO contains all preplanned airspace control measures, it does not describe the most current air picture because of post-publishing changes and immediate airspace requests. Therefore, the brigade A²C² element must continuously request airspace updates/changes from the next higher's A²C² element. If airspace conflicts develop, the brigade A²C² element must alert the next higher's A²C² element immediately so the deconfliction process can begin.

(4) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff determines the size of the maneuver force required to successfully complete the mission.

(a) For attack operations, the brigade staff develops a gun-to-gun lay matrix. This matrix compares the relative combat power of an ATKHB against a given threat. In the example, the tank regiment has about 150 combat vehicles. Assuming an operational readiness rate of 90 percent, the tank regiment has 135 operational combat vehicles. If a 70-percent destruction criteria has been set by a higher echelon, then one ATKHB carrying 155 HELLFIRE missiles is a sufficient force to accomplish the mission (assuming a 70-percent probability of HELLFIRE missile hits).

(b) For air assault operations, the brigade staff coordinates with the supported ground unit to determine how many ground forces are required within a certain timetable in the LZs. This information determines how many aircraft are required at any given time during the operation. The brigade staff determines the number of UH-60 Black Hawk aircraft required—based on 12 combat troops per airframe (seats installed) and 15 combat troops per airframe (seats out/kevlar blanket installed). The brigade staff determines the number of CH-47 Chinook aircraft required—based on 33 combat troops per airframe (seats installed) and 60 combat troops per airframe (seats out). Units SOPs vary; therefore, an aviation LNO from the supporting brigade must verify these figures before any detailed planning takes place. The brigade staff coordinates attack helicopter air assault security, as required. The number of attack helicopters tasked to support the air assault varies depending on the threat situation.

(5) ACTION: The brigade staff determines the size/task organization of the force required to execute the mission. Then the staff prepares and provides all subordinate units taking part in the operation with a warning order (WO). Next, the brigade staff starts to develop the OPORD/fragmentary order(s) (FRAGOs), as appropriate. The OPORDs/FRAGOs incorporate the next higher echelon'sdecide, detect, and deliver methodology into a brigade focus. All aviation brigade internal assets tasked to support the primary aviation unit executing the operation are under OPCON of the primary aviation unit upon receipt of the WO.

(6) ACTION: When conducting attack operations, the brigade staff determines the most tactically advantageous ATKHB BPs. When conducting air assault operations, the air assault task force commander (AATFC) and staff—in coordination with the aviation brigade staff—determine the most tactically advantageous landing zone areas (LZAs) for the AHBs. The brigade staff selects these BPs and LZAs. Then it provides overlays to the appropriate subordinate battalion staffs for further refinement and coordination. The brigade staff constructs ATKBN BPs based on—

(a) Cover and concealment. Depending on the threat acquisition systems, the geographical location of the BP may be the single most important factor in BP construction.Cover is protection from enemy direct fire. Concealment is protection from enemy visual or electronic observation. The BP should provide cover and concealment for aircraft not firing, and concealment for aircraft that are firing.

(b) Width. In close attack operations, there is a high probability that the subordinate attack battalion(s) are able to conduct reconnaissance of their intended BPs before the actual operation. In addition, attack units—operating in a close environment—stand a much higher risk of fratricide because of the proximity of friendly ground units. Therefore, the brigade staff should ensure that the width of the BP provides the executing aviation unit commander the freedom to maneuver in the vicinity of the EA, while remaining out of range of friendly armor and/or small arms weapon systems. Finally, the width of the BP should allow the attack commanders to engage the enemy as far rearward as the BHL. In deep attack operations, there is a high probability that the selected BPs will not have been reconnoitered before the arrival of the executing unit. In addition, the enemy may not be exactly where pre-aircraft launch intelligence estimates indicated they would be. Therefore, the brigade staff should construct BPs with as much width as the tactical situation will allow. This provides the executing unit commander as much flexibility as possible once in the vicinity of the EA.

(c) Depth. The BP depth should extend from the edge of EA to an established rear boundary. The distance from the closest edge of the EA to the rear boundary of the BP should be the same distance as the optimum range of the primary heliborne weapon system to be used. For example, if an AH-64 battalion is used in the attack, the depth of the B should be 9 kilometers (kms) from the edge of the EA to the rear boundary of the BP. (Once inside the BP, the attack commanders will decide the most tactically advantageous firing positions.)

(d) Altitude. The altitude of the BP should be the same or higher than the EA. A position above the EA allows the attack/reconnaissance aircraft a better field of view and the advantage in the engagement.

(7) ACTION. The brigade staff coordinates with the supported ground unit when determining the location(s) of the deep operation LZAs. The LZA is a grouping or cluster of one or more LZs to be used in the deep operation. Each LZA has an on-call restricted operations zone (ROZ) constructed around it. The brigade staff constructs assault helicopter battalion (AHB) LZs based on the following:

(a) Proximity to the objective. LZ locations are objective based—i.e., oriented on the objective— while incorporating all the factors of METT-T.

(b) Terrain conditions. Terrain—specifically slope and ground conditions—dictates whether or not helicopters will be able to land in a potential LZ. Visual reconnaissance of the potential LZ may be difficult or impossible because of the tactical situation. Therefore, a careful map study of the LZ is necessary to determine suitability for landing.

(c) Obstacles. The terrain in and around the LZ should be analyzed to determine its effect on air traffic patterns. The approach and departure paths should be free of obstacles.

(8) ACTION: The brigade A²C² cell requests an on-call ROZ encompassing the EA(s), BPs, and/or LZAs. The ROZ provides the executing aviation unit commander freedom of movement (within certain constraints), control of fires, and fratricide prevention while operating in the ROZ. The purpose of the "on-call" status of the ROZ is to alert the next higher's A²C² cell that the ROZ will be activated only during mission execution and the activation time is pending. The on-call ROZ request is submitted and coordinated through the next higher's A²C² cell to the battlefield coordination element that coordinates airspace requirements with the theater/joint force airspace control authority at the air operations center (AOC). ROZs—like most airspace control measures—must be approved by the airspace control authority (ACA). There is a time lag between the time of the request and ultimate approval by the ACA. The A²C² cell needs to be proactive to submit these requests with enough time to clear the airspace and get approval.

(a) ROZ dimensions. The request for an on-call ROZ will include the ROZ dimensions. If an AHB is the primary aviation unit conducting the operation, the ROZ dimensions should include the EA plus a 9-km buffer zone—based on the AH-64's maximum standoff range—around the attack battalion's BPs. If an AHB is the primary aviation unit conducting the operation, the preference will be to request one ROZ that encompasses each LZA.

(b) ROZ activation time. The request for the on-call ROZ will include a ROZ activation time. The ROZ activation time is the expected window of time during which executing aviation units will operate in the ROZ. The ROZ activation time is based on the executing aviation unit's departure from the AA or forward AA en route to the BP or LZ. The aviation brigade staff continuously updates the next higher's A²C² cell on the expected ROZ activation time.

(c) ROZ deactivation time. The request for the on-call ROZ will include an estimated ROZ deactivation time. The ROZ deactivation time is that time when the executing aviation units will no longer conduct operations in the ROZ. This time is based on the expected time of the last aircraft returning cross-FLOT into friendly territory, i.e., mission completion.

(9) ACTION: The brigade staff selects the Standard Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFRs) and constructs the on-call air corridors to be flown during the operation. SAAFRs are a network of established aircraft routes facilitating the movement of army rotary-wing aircraft. They usually extend from the corps rear area to the rear areas of the ground maneuver brigades. Aviation units conducting operations will transit along the SAAFRs until the route turns into an air corridor. Air corridors are the flight routes army aircraft use after crossing the FLOT; they are temporary in nature. Once the SAAFRs have been selected and the air corridors have been constructed, the brigade staff provides them to the subordinate battalion(s) executing the operation for coordination. After coordination has been conducted with the executing battalion(s), the brigade staff submits the SAAFR and on-call air corridor plan (including expected usage times) to the next higher echelon A²C² cell for approval and coordination. The purpose of the "on-call" status of the air corridors is to alert the next higher's A²C² cell that the air corridors will be activated only during mission execution and the activation time is pending. The brigade staff ensures that all airspace is deconflicted before mission execution. Although SAAFRs do not require ACA approval, it is still critical that the locations of these routes are known and plotted by the ACA and all units they might affect. The weapons control status for AD weapon systems under a SAAFR should be tight to prevent fratricide. In most theaters, the ACA designates that status.

(a) Standard Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFRs). The brigade staff selects SAAFRs based on—

Entry/Exit procedures. Aviation units will be located at fixed bases or AAs. These locations will have established entry/exit procedures before the conduct of any aviation operations. SAAFR selection must consider these entry/exit established procedures.
Terrain. SAAFR selection should exploit the concealment provided by the geographical environment. High terrain that can be scanned by threat electronic capabilities should be avoided. Aircraft cresting the high ground can provide the threat with radar signatures even at extended distances.
Fire support systems. Although SAAFRs are constructed to avoid ground-based FS systems, artillery units may displace frequently. These artillery location shifts should be monitored by staff elements above the aviation brigade level; the brigade staff should be alerted when such an event takes place. In the event artillery units do displace to positions within the dimensions of a SAAFR—and the SAAFR is considered to be the best tactical route to the FLOT—then the aviation brigade staff must ensure that all artillery tubes, rocket launchers, and missile systems are shut down during the operation. This deconfliction process is coordinated through the next higher's A²C² cell.
Minimum risk routes (MRRs). An MRR is an air route used by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft to transit from rear locations to regions across the FLOT. SAAFR selection should avoid active MRRs, although the tactical situation dictates whether or not this can be accomplished. Avoidance of active MRRs reduces planning factors and execution considerations.
Special operations activities. Army and Air Force SOF will use the same SAAFR network as Army aviation aircraft. SAAFR selection must consider other forces conducting operations using the same SAAFR airspace.

(b) Air corridors. The brigade staff construct/select air corridors based on—

Dimensions. Air corridors should be 1-km wide and for one-way traffic only. Air corridors will extend from the surface up to the coordinating altitude. The ACO stipulates the coordinating altitude.
Enemy ADA. Enemy ADA is the single most important factor in the selection of an air corridor. Enemy acquisition and weapons engagement ranges must be plotted to ensure that the executing aviation unit has the greatest possible chance for mission success. The effects of terrain on threat acquisition and weapons engagement ranges must be considered when constructing air corridors. The result should be air corridors that provide the executing aviation unit commander with the flight path of least resistance.
Enemy ground order of battle (GOB). Enemy ground units (other than ADA) can present as much of an AD threat as primary AD weapon systems. Air corridor construction should be planned through the areas that intelligence channels indicate as having the least amount of ground units.
BP/LZA entry and exit points. The release point (RP) of the air corridor should facilitate a tactical ingress into the battalion's BP/LZ. Reciprocally, the start point (SP) of the return air corridor should facilitate a tactical egress from the battalion's BP/LZ. The enemy situation dictates the location of both the ingressing RP and egressing SP.

(10) ACTION: The brigade staff plans for localized JSEAD even if aircraft penetration into hostile territory is to be conducted under stealth conditions. If a subordinate battalion within the aviation brigade has been OPCONed to a ground maneuver unit—e.g., an air assault battalion under OPCON of a ground air assault task force [AATF]—then the gaining command is responsible for planning and executing JSEAD operations. The supporting aviation unit provides assistance. However, when the aviation brigade is tasked to conduct brigade-level assault and/or attack operations, the aviation brigade staff plans and executes JSEAD operations. The aviation brigade staff plans JSEAD as follows:

(a) The brigade staff continues to monitor and update the threat situation along the on-call air corridors and ROZ(s). This process continues until mission completion. All intelligence updates are passed to the subordinate battalions as quickly as possible.

(b) The brigade staff requests on-call suppression of all current and potential threat acquisition and engagement systems along the air corridors and in the ROZ(s). Fires will be planned for the entire time aviation elements are across the FLOT. If the JSEAD fires are to be executed by the brigade staff—i.e., timed JSEAD—the duration of the suppressive fires vary depending on the threat situation; however, but the last round should impact 2 minutes before friendly aircraft transition the area. Therefore, SEAD fires for any given area should equal aircraft transition time minus 2 minutes. If the SEAD fires are to be executed by the executing aviation unit, then the executing aviation unit commander will initiate the SEAD fires.

(c) The brigade Air Force/Air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) representative(s) request on-call suppression of all current and potential threat acquisition and engagement systems along the air corridors and in the ROZ(s) that cannot be suppressed by Army indirect FS systems. In addition, all service component laser identification codes are retrieved from the ACO (or appropriate source) and provided to the executing ATKHB.

(11) ACTION: The brigade staff coordinates the air movement of Army air transportable artillery systems that must be repositioned by air to support the SEAD operation. If brigade external air movement assets are required for this operation —i.e., additional utility/cargo helicopter support— requests are submitted through the next higher's G3. Additional utility/cargo assets tasked to support another aviation brigade are under OPCON of the gaining command for the duration of the air movement operation. This may include artillery system repositioning after the operation is complete.

(12) ACTION: The brigade staff plans for EW aircraft support. This includes all Army and joint EW aircraft that can be tasked for the operation. This support will be on-call. The brigade staff confirms that tasked joint assets are specifically designated for the operation in the ACO. The brigade staff plans for/request airspace ROZ(s), as necessary, for the brigade internal EW assets. The tactical situation is considered when planning the location of EW aircraft orbits ROZ(s).

(13) ACTION: The brigade staff plans for/request communications support aircraft (e.g., Improved Guard Rail V) as required to maintain/supplement over-the-horizon communications. Communications support also may be provided by joint assets—e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Army (aviation brigade external) and Navy communications support aircraft assets are requested through the next higher's G3. The brigade Air Force LNO requests Air Force aircraft communications support through Air Force channels. Liaison personnel ensure that the aviation brigade staff is provided with the proper frequencies for any given operation.

(14) ACTION: The brigade staff integrates FARP operations into the operation. Aircraft supporting FARP operations must be given the same advance notice as other executing units in the operations WO. If subordinate units require a FARP to be positioned on terrain not controlled by the aviation brigade, then the aviation brigade staff must request nonaviation brigade terrain usage through the next higher's G3. After receiving approval for terrain occupation, aviation brigade liaison personnel should conduct face-to-face coordination with the unit owning the terrain.

(15) ACTION: The brigade staff ensures that all communications procedures have been coordinated with the appropriate subordinate unit commanders and staffs. Although the brigade staff plans for JSEAD fires and EW support, the executing aviation unit commander probably will give the order to shoot fires and activate EW support. The brigade staff must ensure that all brigade internal and external communications frequencies are coordinated horizontally and vertically.

a. A trigger event drives the execution of an attack operation. A trigger event is an enemy or friendly action that causes the ATKHB to launch and engage the enemy. Examples of a trigger event may be a threat armored force transitioning through a named area of interest (NAI) or a friendly force conducting an attack operation in another part of the theater. The next higher's staff notifies the aviation brigade of the trigger event.

b. The execution of an air assault operation is time driven or event driven. The time sequence for a time-driven air assault operation is stipulated in the next higher's OPORD. Final coordination times for an air assault operation are synchronized between the executing air assault unit and the supported ground unit. An example of a trigger event for an air assault operation would be that a successful deception operation has been conducted in another part of the AO. The event shifts the enemy's focus and security away from the air assault objective. Again, final coordination times are synchronized between the executing air assault unit and the supported unit.

c. The trigger event is the catalyst by which the aviation brigade's next higher echelon gives the command to execute the deep operation. Upon notification to execute the deep operation, the aviation brigade staff executes the following actions:

(1) ACTION: All subordinate executing units are directed to increase their readiness conditions to a final pre-launch status. Those units under OPCON to the primary executing aviation unit are notified by their controlling headquarters. Local SOPs dictate the amount of time required to attain the final pre-launch status, but the command to launch will be transmitted only after all other pre-launch procedures have been coordinated. Mission execution orders are transmitted to subordinate units by the quickest, most secure means available.

(2) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff provides a final pre-launch intelligence update to the executing unit(s). This update is conducted either face-to-face with unit commanders or transmitted electronically.

(3) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff requests—through the next higher's A²C² cell—the activation of all ROZs, air corridors, and special use airspace (SUA) relevant to the operation. In addition, the staff alerts the next higher's A²C² cell that use of the SAAFR will commence with aircraft launch. The brigade staff verifies that all requested airspace has been activated before aircraft launch. Airspace deconfliction takes time so these requests need to be submitted well in advance of mission execution.

(4) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff requests JSEAD FS. Service component liaison personnel and the brigade FSO alert/update their appropriate brigade external staffs. The final command to fire JSEAD may be generated by the brigade staff, but probably will be generated by the executing aviation unit commander or designated air mission commander.

(5) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff alerts the next higher's G3 if over-the-horizon communications activity can be expected. Request are made to alert the supporting Army and joint aircraft.

(6) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff alerts the brigade's FARP elements that the operation is being executed.

(7) ACTION: After ensuring that all pre-launch procedures have been coordinated, the aviation brigade commander/staff orders/directs the subordinate unit commander to launch and execute the mission.

(8) ACTION: The aviation brigade staff receives subordinate battalion BDA reports and updates the next higher echelon as required.

(9) ACTION: Upon mission completion, the aviation brigade staff requests deactivation of all ROZs, air corridors, and special use airspace (SUA) relevant to the operation. This request is conducted through the next higher's A²C² cell.

a. Rear Area Planning. To plan rear area operations, the aviation brigade must understand the next higher commander's priorities of protection. The brigade also must have the next higher's rear operations plan. In addition, the brigade must conduct a thorough IPB and establish the C² functions peculiar to rear operations. The priority of protection list includes all of the critical assets that the next higher commander has designated to be secured in the rear area. These assets may include—

C² facilities.
Ammunition supply points.
Class III facilities.
Corps/division reserve forces.
Main supply routes (MSRs).
Bridges.
Corps/division support area.

b. Protecting Assets. The next higher commander assigns the priorities for the protection of these assets. These assets are placed on a standing list in the order of precedence. Intelligence and AD assets are vital; they must be focused according to the rear operations plan. Also, the corps aviation brigade must coordinate with these assets. The brigade also must maintain communication nets with these assets.

(1) The rear CP publishes the rear area OPLAN. The OPLAN contains tactical guidance, task organization, and assignment of missions to various elements that are assigned to protect the rear area. This plan normally is transmitted as an annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. It contains specific information—such as unit locations and FS coordination measures—required to develop the aviation brigade staff's OPLAN for rear operations. The corps rear OPLAN allows the aviation brigade and subordinate units to begin preparing for employment in the rear area. For example, attack assets with an on-order rear operations commitment can start reconnoitering BPs and routes to BPs—day, night, night vision devices (NVDs)—around critical rear area assets. Assault helicopter units—with an on-order rear operations mission—also can begin reconnoitering routes (primary NVD-day) while looking for suitable LZs around critical assets. Artillery and infantry units should be collocated with their respective assault and medium helicopter units. Coordination with bases or base clusters and AD units also is essential. This planning helps ensure that the employment of aviation units in rear operations is highly responsive.

(2) Fundamental to the aviation brigade's employment in rear operations is an extensive IPB both behind and beyond the FLOT. This IPB results in fairly accurate predictions of threat objectives in the rear area as well as air and ground avenues of approach to these objectives. The rear CP can develop an LZ or PZ denial plan by the rear CP based on LZs identified by the IPB. Aviation assets also may play a vital role in producing or contributing to the IPB. For example, these assets can reconnoiter possible LZs and routes used by the enemy. The results of the IPB and METT-T then are considered by the aviation brigade when assigning missions and priorities to subordinate units. With limited aviation assets, other forces—such as AD units—must be integrated to cover suspected AAs, LZs, and likely objectives. The IPB—which allows for the allocation of various early warning systems defined below—ensures that the tactical combat force (TCF) has enough notice and reaction time to employ its combat forces.

(a) Human intelligence (HUMINT).

(b) Signals intelligence (SIGINT).

(c) Communications intelligence (COMINT).

(d) Electronic intelligence (ELINT).

(3) C² of rear operations rests with the rear CP. Base clusters and TCFs report to the CP when executing the rear operations plan. To be tied into this C² network, the aviation brigade establishes voice communications with the rear CP. It also sends an LNO to assist in aviation planning at the corps level. Once an incursion is detected, the responding force establishes voice communications with the base defense or base cluster targeted by the threat incursion. Keep in mind that the TCF normally woudl respond only to a level III rear area incursion. The base cluster defense handles level I incursions. Level II incursions probably will require some external assistance like an MP unit.

(4) The final stage of rear operations planning for the aviation brigade is the control portion of the C² process. After analyzing the IPB products, the priority of protection, and the corps rear OPLAN, the aviation brigade identifies several decision points or time lines that optimize aviation employment. The rear CP ensures that the appropriate assets —joint acquisition, detection, and intelligence collection assets—both aerial and ground—are concentrated on that area of the battlefield. It also ensures that adequate warning is given to the aviation forces involved in rear operations. Finally, all aspects of planning for rear operations must be coordinated into a realistic and time